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USING NATURAL SCIENCES FOR CULTURAL EXPANSION: 
THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST AGENDA FOR THE BALKANS
Maria Zarifi
ABSTRACT: This article highlights the political merit natural sciences were awarded under the
totalitarian regime of Nazi Germany and their propagandistic role in Hitler’s foreign policy
agenda for the Balkans, a region which was expected to replace Germany’s colonies lost in
World War I. It accounts further for the policies and strategies National Socialists used to
exert cultural influence on the countries of South-East Europe, namely through a number of
institutions with which natural sciences were in one way or another involved in order to
promote German culture abroad. The promotion of the German language and, to a certain
degree, the Nazi ideology was a precondition for familiarising the Balkan countries with
German scientific achievements, which would pave the way for an economic and political
infiltration in that region. Therefore, natural sciences, as part of the German intellect,
acquired political and economic connotations hidden behind the euphemistic term of
cultural policy, designed for this region of geopolitical importance. The article is based
almost exclusively on unpublished German records. 
Introduction
After the end of World War I and the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919,
Germany was forced to withdraw from the group of colonial powers, as it was
deprived of all its territorial and other acquisitions abroad. The sanctions of the
Treaty dramatically affected the young Republic’s international affairs. At the
scientific level, the country lost all of its institutions that had been created or
supported by the Germans since 1900, losing at the same time its long-lasting
influence on local scientific communities.1 German science and research was
cut off from the international scientific community and was restricted to its
national borders, threatened with provincialism and backwardness. What was
at stake was Germany’s culture and its national image abroad; in other words,
its economic and political hegemony.
1 At the beginning of the twentieth century, Germany expanded natural sciences beyond
European borders, setting up four scientific centres overseas: the Centre of Theoretical
Physics in La Plata, in Argentina, the Geophysical Observatory located at Apia, capital of
Western Samoa in the South Pacific, the German-Chinese University in Tsingtau, and the
German Medical School in Woosung, a suburb of Shanghai, China. See Lewis Pyenson,
Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences: German Expansion Overseas, 1900-1930, New
York 1985.
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In the inter-war years, Germany, having nothing left to defend from its
glorious past but its culture, focused on advertising it abroad by making it an
essential part of its foreign policy planning. The Weimar Republic established
a number of institutions dedicated to the cultivation and promotion of its
culture beyond its borders. The creation of the Cultural Section at the Foreign
Ministry, in 1919, was the first decisive step towards this direction. During
those years, the Balkans, which traditionally were one of the regions the
foreign cultural policy of German imperialism concentrated on, regained its
particular significance for the deprived Germany.2 German cultural and
economic interests in the Balkans led to the establishment of a number of
institutions to serve as a tool for strengthening German presence there and, in
particular, in friendly territory. These conditions were primarily met in
Bulgaria, Germany’s ally in the war. Educational institutions, such as the
German Academy, created branches for disseminating German culture,
primarily the German language. The cultural presence of Germany abroad was
not confined, however, to the foundation of language schools or to the
creation of philological and archaeological societies and institutes. Moreover,
it took a practical and applied character with the establishment of research and
experimental centres that turned out to serve Germany’s economic and
military interests. In Europe, the only such institutes were the zoological
stations in Naples and Rovigno, both under German control. The former was
a model for international scientific co-operation, and the latter was a branch
of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem since its
establishment, in 1911. Both of them, however, were confiscated according to
the provisions of the 1919 Peace Agreement.
Nevertheless, language was the precondition for attracting young promising
people from “good families” to visit German universities, because a co-operative
native élite, even a small one, was regarded as vital. “No imperial power,”
observed Sreberny-Mohammadi, “could rely on its own nationals alone”3 and
educating or training teachers of technology, civil engineers, architects,
mechanical engineers, mining engineers and science teachers, as well as doctors,
economists, lawyers and civil servants, was crucial for Germany to re-establish
200 Maria Zarifi
2 Other such areas were the Near East and Latin America. Otfried Danckelmann, “Aus
der Praxis auswärtiger Kulturpolitik des deutschen Imperialismus, 1933-1945”, Zeitschrift
für Geschichtswissenschaft 6 (1972), pp. 718-737, here p. 724.
3 Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, “The Many Cultural Faces of Imperialism”, in Peter
Golding and Phil Harris (eds), Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Globalisation, Communication
and the New International Order, London 1997, pp. 49-68, here p. 60.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 09:06:05 |
political and economic influence abroad.4 Therefore, Germany launched a
scholarship programme for students who could facilitate its interests in their
home countries. This policy was not a German originality, and the Weimar
Republic had to deal with the established French influence, not only in Bulgaria,
but also in other Balkan countries, such as Greece.
Although Greece was not as favourably disposed towards Germany as
Bulgaria was after the end of World War I, there was a strong affiliation
between the two countries that dated back to the creation of the modern Greek
state and the arrival of King Otto in Greece, in 1832. Many Greeks, primarily
from the local élite, decided to study in Germany. On their return, they staffed
the most important administrative institutions of the Greek kingdom and
apparently felt favourable to their intellectual “homeland”. Although this trend
was not the result of the Reich’s well-designed foreign cultural policy, it created
a fertile soil for a more systematic cultural effort in Greece in the years to come.
Despite the fact that Greece was under the strong cultural influence of France
after World War I, Germany was the indispensable leading technological and
scientific power in Greece, having the absolute monopoly in certain fields, such
as engineering and medicine. Germany encouraged and promoted the
Germanophile climate in the small Balkan country basically through the
German schools, the activities of the German-Greek Society and a number of
scholarships granted to teachers and young scientists. In addition, the Kaiser
Wilhelm Society, being the only remaining German scientific and research
institution that enjoyed international recognition at that time, approached two
Balkan states, Yugoslavia and Greece, in quest of favourable conditions to
continue the research projects carried out in Naples and Rovigno. However, it
was only in the late years of National Socialism and during World War II that
the Kaiser Wilhelm Society succeeded in expanding to the Balkan Peninsula,
establishing a network of research centres, which were also supported by the
German Army. In addition to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes, other networking
institutions such as the German Academy, the German Scientific Institute and
the South-East European Society contributed not only to the promotion of
Germany’s culture, but also to the establishment of its economic control over
the Balkans. 
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4 Lewis Pyenson, “Pure Learning and Political Economy: Science and European
Expansion in the Age of Imperialism”, in R. P. W. Visser, H. J. M. Bos, L. C. Palm and H.
A. M. Snelders (eds), New Trends in the History of Science: Proceedings of a Conference
Held at the University of Utrecht, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 209-278, here p. 239.
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Organising Nazi Foreign Cultural Policy and Propaganda
Although a complete theory for the role of technology in Germany had existed
since the last quarter of the nineteenth century and its significance for the
state’s reorganisation and rearmament was acknowledged by the Nazis, this was
not the case for science. Having succeeded in integrating German engineering
technology into the German national culture and soul through “a process of
selectively borrowing from past cultures”, the conditions were created for the
full technological programme launched by the Nazis after 1936.5 Scientists and
modern German science, on the other hand, being theoretical in nature,
clashed with Hitler’s ideology, as theory was regarded as alien to the German
soul. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that when the Nazis came to power they
did not have any particular science policy agenda. The official texts of the
Party6 did not give any guidelines as to what National Socialist science should
be. Even the so-called “Aryan”, “Nordic” or “German” physics was not a clearly
defined set of beliefs, as Alan Beyerchen argues.7 The only thing that was
explicitly proclaimed was the denouncement of what the Nazis called liberal,
Jewish, rational, theoretical, materialistic science and the rejection of objectivity
and internationality in science.8 Aryan technology and science should be based
on experiment and observation. It is remarkable, however, that even some
works written by some distinguished ideologues and despite the fact that they
had all the requisite credentials to become textbooks of Nazi ideology were
rejected by the Ministry of Propaganda. This was the case of Ernst Krieck, a
professor of education who was the author of Das Reich als Träger Europas.
Krieck was embittered by his rejection by the Nazis and he decided to put an
end to his scientific work, confessing that he no longer knew “what science can
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5 See Karl-Heinz Ludwig, Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich, Düsseldorf 1974,
chapter three; Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in
Weimar and the Third Reich, Cambridge 1984. p. 210. About the “cultural policy” or
“cultural revolution” of the German engineers, as Herf calls it, see chapter seven of his book.
6 Some of the most propagandistic and influential texts were: Das Manifest zur
Berechnung der Zinsknechtschaft des Geldes (Munich 1919) by Gottfried Feder; Mythos des
20. Jahrhunderts (Munich 1930) by Alfred Rosenberg; and of course Adolf Hitler’s Mein
Kampf (Munich 1925).
7 Beyerchen argues that Aryan physics was more politics than physics. Alan Beyerchen,
Scientists under Hitler: Politics and the Physics Community in the Third Reich, New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, pp. 123-140. See also Mark Walker, German National
Socialism and the Quest of Nuclear Power, 1939-1949, Cambridge 1989, pp. 60-66.
8 Beyerchen, op. cit., pp. 131, 136.
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be, is allowed to be, or must be”.9 Such incidents could not be avoided as long
as there was no established institution that could provide guiding principles to
the fundamental problem of the “Aryanisation” of German science and
research. Several attempts were made to set up such an organisation, but all
proved unsuccessful. The main reason for these failures was the rivalries
between the State and the Party or within the Party itself. 
Although the Nazis ruled out the notion of internationalism in science, they
aspired to make German science and technology not only internationally
accepted but also dominant. The lack of a systematic and coherent science policy,
however, was to prove no bar to them putting that aspiration in the Reich’s
foreign cultural policy agenda. As the priorities of the Third Reich until 1936
were the organisation of the State and its economic recovery from the
Depression, the Nazis made use of institutions already established in the Weimar
Republic to support and promote German culture and intellect abroad. Despite
the fact that the structure and personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
remained more or less the same until 1937, some changes were indeed made.
Therefore, the director of the Ministry’s cultural sector was replaced because of
the 1933 “Law for the Restoration of the Career Civil Service” (Gesetz zur
Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums). A new director was appointed in
March 1933, in the person of the historian Dr Stieve, the former ambassador in
Riga, who for ten years had been in charge of publishing the “Foreign Ministry
Archives against the Lies for Germany’s Responsibility in the Great War”.
However, he was not a Nazi sympathiser, as his successor, Fritz von Twardowski,
reported in 1970.10 Additional small changes were made when the Ministry for
the People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda (Reichsministerium für
Volksaufklärung und Propaganda) also wanted to get involved in the Reich’s
foreign cultural relations. 
It should be noted that the Nazis perceived the development and cultivation
of those relations through the prism of their ideology, namely only as potential
political propaganda.11 This perception was quite different from the rationale of
the Foreign Ministry, which resisted Goebbels’ plans to transfer and incorporate
the cultural sector of the Foreign Ministry into his own. Ultimately, the Reich
Ministry of Science, Education and Public Instruction (RfWEV or REM)12 was
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9 Cited in Michael Gruettner, “Wissenschaft”, in Wolfgang Benz et al. (eds), Enzyklopädie
des Nationalsozialismus, Munich 1997, pp. 135-153, here p. 144.
10 Fritz von Twardowski, Anfänge der deutschen Kulturpolitik zum Ausland, Bonn
1970, p. 29.
11 Ibid.
12 In May 1934 the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Science, Education and Art (Reichs
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also involved in Germany’s foreign cultural affairs, seeking funds from the
Ministry of the Interior intended for the Foreign Ministry’s cultural department.
In particular, the REM sought responsibility for the Reich’s scientific, academic,
student and educational relations abroad from the Foreign Ministry.13 In 1935,
the ministry also took under its control part of the German Academic Exchange
Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, DAAD) and the Alexander
von Humboldt Stiftung, the two major academic exchange organisations,14 and
went even further, signing cultural agreements with other countries, without the
acquiescence of the Foreign Ministry.15 After strong protests from the latter
ministry, it was decided that academic exchanges should be organised,
supported and controlled by both ministries, sharing responsibility for this area.
Furthermore, the establishment of the National Socialist Organisation for Issues
Abroad (Auslandsorganisation (AO) der NSDAP), in 1934, put extra obstacles in
the path of the Reich’s foreign cultural policy. The purpose of the AO was to
organise the German minorities into a solid and effective group for Germany’s
political interests abroad.16 In the course of time, the organisation intervened in
academic travels to foreign countries and the selection of lecturers, professors
and researchers to travel abroad, very often excluding the foremost scientists.
When the war broke out, however, the involvement of the AO in propaganda
abroad – and in particular its Cultural Service (Kulturamt) –17 was increased.
South-East Europe became the focus of that propaganda, and a series of
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und Preussische Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Kunst – also known as the
Preussische Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung) was incorporated into
the Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Public Instruction (Reichsministerium für
Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksaufklärung or Volksbildung), and Bernhard Rust became
its head. 
13 Volkhard Laitenberger, Akademischer Austausch und auswärtige Kulturpolitik. Der
Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), 1923-1945, Göttingen 1976, pp. 81 f.
(footnote 3). 
14 Ibid., p. 82 (footnote 6). Under the auspices of the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung
were the Deutschland-Stiftung des Mitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftstages, the Stipendien des
technisch-wirtschaftlichen Beratungsdienstes, the Stipendien der Zwischenstaatlichen
Verbände, the Friedrich List-Stipendien der deutschen Wirtschaft and the Deutsche
Luftfahrt-Stipendien.
15 This was the case with Hungary. See Twardowski, Anfänge, pp. 32 f.
16 Emil Ehrich, Die Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP, Berlin 1937, pp. 11-15. The
author was Gauamtsleiter der AO der NSDAP. See also Seppo Kuusisto, Alfred Rosenberg in
der Nationalsozialistischen Aussenpolitik, 1933-39, Helsinki 1984, in particular chapter IV.
17 For the structure and the several departments and services of the AO see Ehrich, Die
Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP, pp. 18 ff.
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scientific travels by prominent German scholars to major Balkan cities was
organised in agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.18 The propaganda
plan intended to invite German and foreign scholars (university professors,
doctors, teachers, journalists, economists and industrialists) to lecture on their
area of expertise in local closed circles of ten to twelve people and, through the
scientific interest that would be raised, to serve Germany’s political concerns.
The reliability of the National Socialist convictions of those people was,
however, a prerequisite to any involvement, while personal acquaintances were
essential. The propaganda-related thrust of the whole undertaking was to be
kept secret.19 From April to July 1940, for example, about fifteen scientists were
sent to Bulgaria, Greece, or both.20
Table 1 
Name Towns in visit order Date of travel beginning
Baeumler Thessaloniki, Athens, Sofia 20-4-1940
Berve Athens 20-5-1940
Boehme Zagreb, Athens, Patras, Thessaloniki, Sofia, Budapest 2-5-1940
[That date was later altered.]
Doelger Athens 2-5-1940
Fiala Sofia 15-4-1940
Kaftan Sofia 10-5-1940
Kindermann Belgrade, Neusatz, Ossijek, Athens 2-5-1940
Kroh Sofia, Plovdiv, Burgas, Varna, Russe, Thessaloniki, 15-5-1940
Athens, Budapest
Muehlens Belgrade, Athens, Sofia 15-4-1940
Nordmann Neusatz 15-5-1940
Schmidt Athens, Thessaloniki 20-5-1940
Staebel Belgrade, Ossijek, Thessaloniki, Sofia, Plovdiv 1-6-1940
Unverricht Zagreb, Athens, Patras, (Volos), Thessaloniki, Sofia 15-5-1940
Vogt Neusatz, Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna 1-6-1940
Weltzien Zagreb 10-5-1940
Source: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PAAA), R 60661: “NSDAP. Die Leitung der Auslands-
Propaganda (Heinz Otto)” to Herrn Gesandten Altenburg Auswärtigen Amt, Berlin, 18-03-1940.
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18 The focus was set on Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. See “NSDAP. Die
Leitung der Auslands-Propaganda. (Heinz Otto)” to Herrn Gesandten Altenburg Auswärtigen
Amt, Berlin, 18-03-1940 (paragraph: “Entwurf”), in the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen
Amtes (PAAA), R 60661. [The PAAA is located in Berlin.]
19 Ibid. (paragraph: “Aktion für Kulturpropaganda”).
20 Undated document [1940]: “Aufzeichnung. Betr.: Besucheraktion”, in PAAA, R
60661. About the lectures held by German scholars in the Balkans from September 1940
until June 1941 see table A of the document: “Kulturpolitische Planung in den
Balkanländern während dees Winterhalbjahrs 1940/41”, in PAAA, R 61415.
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The Ministry of the Interior, which supported the German cultural
institutes and the Archaeological Institute in Rome, as well as the Zoological
Station in Naples and the Institute of Art History in Florence, also participated
in the German culture campaign abroad. These institutes were under the
patronage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in 1934 handed over the
direction to the above ministry. Last but not least, party organisations like the
Archive Administration of the Mobilisation Echelon Rosenberg (Archivever-
waltung Einsatzstab Rosenberg) and the Ahnenerbe Office of the Reichsführer
SS also aspired to participate in the activities and research abroad, whether
planned or already under way.21
It is clear that since the early years of Hitler’s regime, there were differences
among these various institutions. Those differences were developed in the
following years into power ambitions, reflecting the profound antagonisms
between the Party and the State, and the chaotic bureaucracy brought about by
this dynamic. “Too many services are working side by side, usually without
knowing of each other’s existence”, noted the director of the cultural
department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fritz von Twardowski, in 1942.22
The pressure this situation exerted on the Foreign Ministry, which bore the
main responsibility for cultural policy abroad, forced Twardowski to plead
desperately with several Party organisations to avoiding any intrusion in the
Ministry’s affairs, because this would create conflicts that would eventually
damage the nation’s interests.23 In 1936, the “cultural desk” of the Foreign
Ministry was renamed the “cultural political sector”.24 That change indicated
the fact that foreign cultural policy had begun to be recognised by the Nazis as
a significant factor on the international political stage. 
The year 1937 was the turning point in Nazi Germany’s foreign cultural
policy. At the Party’s extravagant annual festivities in Nuremberg Hitler made
his first speech about cultural policy, in which he placed this kind of policy in
the framework of the general State policy:25 “This state should not be an
authority [Macht] without culture, a power [Kraft] without beauty. The
armament of a nation is morally justified, only when its shield and sword have
a higher mission. Therefore, we do not aspire to the brutal force of a Genghis
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21 “Vortrag von Twardowski, anlässlich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August
1942”. (Geheim!), in PAAA, R 60608. 
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Twardowski, Anfänge, p. 33. 
25 Ibid., p. 38.
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Khan, but the affluent power to create a strong social and patronage community
as a bearer and guardian of a higher culture!”26
How seriously Hitler meant those words, as Hausmann remarks, remains in
question. What is certain, however, is that the Nazis echoed the Weimar
Republic’s conviction that Germany had lost the war because the country
lacked intellectual rather than material weapons. “We did not lose the war,”
argued the Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, “because our cannons
failed, but rather because our intellectual weapons did not fire.”27
In 1938 Joachim von Ribbentrop was appointed as the new foreign minister
and one year later Fritz von Twardowski became head of the cultural-political
sector. The distinction between “cultural policy” and “propaganda” present in the
Weimar Republic was now abandoned, despite Twardowski’s reservations.28
“Cultural propaganda” was now used as a synonym of “cultural policy” and the
Ministry of Propaganda itself tried anew to take the cultural affairs of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs under its control. The latter regarded “the lighter
muses” as propaganda, namely the concerts, theatre, art and other exhibitions,
and poetry reading.29 These undertakings, as well as sports events and radio
broadcasts, were the only areas that eventually came under Goebbels’ control and
were sponsored by his ministry.30 Furthermore, the bilateral cultural societies,
like the German-French Society, the German-Bulgarian Society, the German-
Greek Society and so forth, which for decades had been supported by private
funds, were recruited by Goebbels for propaganda purposes.31 However, the
most important issues, namely German education, language and scientific affairs
abroad, remained the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry. In 1937, its cultural
sector was further divided into eleven departments. Among them were the
department Kult W, which was responsible for the promotion of German science
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26 Quoted in Frank-Rutger Hausmann, “Auch im Krieg schweigen die Musen nicht”, Die
Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Institute im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Göttingen 2001, pp. 19 f. 
27 Joseph Goebbels, Reden (25 March 1933), cited in Herf, Reactionary Modernism,
p. 195.
28 “Vortrag von Twardowski, anlässlich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August
1942”. See also Hausmann, “Auch im Krieg”, pp. 20 f. (footnote 21). Kurt Düwell made in
his 1976 work a basic distinction between the notions regarding foreign cultural relations:
Deutschlands auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 1918-1932. Grundlinien und Dokumente, Cologne
1976, pp. 35 ff. 
29 “Vortrag von Twardowski, anlässlich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August
1942”.
30 Twardowski, Anfänge, p. 31.
31 Ibid., p. 40.
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abroad, i.e. congresses, travel, lectures and German books; the department Kult
U, responsible for university affairs, professors and students and their relation
with other countries, as well as scholarships; and the Kult I department, in charge
of the German institutes abroad.32 The Foreign Ministry, and in particular Fritz
von Twardowski, strongly and explicitly emphasised that propaganda and
cultural policy had to remain separate for the sake of Germany’s influence
abroad. Twardowski, in his revealing and forceful speech in the meeting of
cultural councillors (Kulturreferententagung) on 13 August 1942, made a clear
distinction between propaganda, cultural propaganda and cultural policy:
By “propaganda” I understand the effort to influence a country’s public
opinion, in relation with an acute political, economic or military
situation. Propaganda works, therefore, in the short term. There is also,
of course, the cultural propaganda – Kulturpropaganda – but this is for
the big cultural nations only a repercussion of a hostile propaganda that
denies our cultural achievements. […] In addition, exerting cultural
policy means presenting and establishing an intellectual leading
ambition; it means organising an intellectual co-operation between
nations; moreover, it means achieving an enduring intellectual influence
over a select intellectual élite of other nations and making it, as far as
possible, dependent on the German intellect.33
Warning about the damage a blunt cultural propaganda policy might cause
to Germany’s influence, Twardowski stressed that the candidate country with
which Germany planned to develop cultural relations should decide of its own
free will about any future cultural collaboration with the Reich: “No political
or economic pressure [should be applied] for the sake of cultural work of any
kind. Equality and reciprocity, no violence but dialogue, cultural exchange at
its broadest, not one-sided performance [should be our principles]. In short, we
must exercise our cultural policy with soft gloves [...]”34
In 1932-33, the dean of the faculty of philosophy at the University of
Leipzig, Professor Weickmann, in his opening speech talked about a global
cultural community and echoing the post-war trauma he stressed that Germans
wished not only economic, but also cultural relations with countries that could
understand the German spirit. Nevertheless, the cultural exchange, he argued
further, should have a national character and Germany should try to promote
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32 Ibid., p. 37.
33 “Vortrag von Twardowski, anlässlich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August
1942”.
34 Ibid.
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its own to the young foreign scholars, particularly to those supported by the
Reich’s scholarship foundations, namely the DAAD and the Alexander von
Humboldt Stiftung. South-East Europe should have priority, underlined the
German professor.35
In 1939, though, when the war broke out, Germany’s scientific
communication with the English-speaking world was interrupted. The Nazis
turned to Europe, which they regarded as their future territory, where – among
other things – they could impose the New Order of learning, inspired by the
National Socialist ideals. In occupied countries, the existing organisations for
the cultivation and promotion of German culture received additional State
support for their propaganda purpose. The German Academy with its branches
in several cities in occupied European countries was the leading organisation in
co-ordinating and controlling the Reich’s cultural activities, focusing on the
expansion and dissemination of the German language. Planning documents
drawn up in 1933 suggest that the Academy should focus its activities on five
geographical areas: the Near and Far East, South Africa, Latin America and the
Balkans.36 The numerous “German Institutes” (Deutsche Schule) and the
“Goethe Institutes”, which operated under the auspices of the German
Academy, increased the number of language courses offered to the local
population and scientists. In addition to propagating the German language,
these institutions promoted the German universities that young scientists could
visit to become familiar with the “superior” German intellect and
achievements. Exchange programmes for lecturing, as well as summer schools,
were organised for senior scientists. It is interesting to note that the Nazis were
very eager to create professorial chairs for language and literature at foreign
universities, even at technical institutes, as was the case in Greece, seeing these
as the ultimate corroboration of their cultural influence abroad. This tactic was
expected to ensure that German would gradually become Europe’s common
language and also the international second language of choice overseas.37
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35 “Akademische Auslandsstelle der Universität Leipzig. Tätigkeitsbericht, 16-07-1932 /
30-09-1933”, in PAAA, R 64028.
36 At the end of 1933 seven out of seventeen branches of the Academy were located in
Greece. Hagen Fleischer, “Europas Rükkehr nach Griechenland. Kulturpolitik der
Grossmächte in einem Staat der Peripherie”, in Herald Heppner and Olga Katsiardi-Hering
(eds), Die Griechen und Europa. Aussen- und Innensichten im Wandel der Zeit, Vienna
1998, pp. 125-191, here p. 141. As for the activities of the German Academy in Greece see
Fedra Koutsoukou, Die deutsche auswärtige Kultur- und Sprachpolitik in Griechenland,
1933-1944 (chapter five), thesis defended at the Technische Universität Berlin in Spring 2006.
37 Pamela Spence Richards, “The Movement of Scientific Knowledge from and to
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Nevertheless, the creation of language and literature chairs abroad, and in
particular in the Balkans, was not a policy pursued only by Germany in this
regard. France, Britain, even Italy and Spain had the same ambition: to gain a
foothold in the foreign academic élite and to influence as many as they could
for their own interests and prestige, transforming the foreign learning and
research institutions into cultural-political arenas. 
One of the early important organisations created by Nazi Germany, in order
to serve its cultural political battle in the Balkan field, was the “Association of
Bi-national Unions and Organisations” (Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher
Verbände und Einrichtungen). The Vereinigung was established in 1938 and
brought under its aegis the existing bilateral societies. It was subject to the SS
and its president was the SS-Obergruppenführer Werner Lorenz. In November
1938 Lorenz demonstrated the purpose of the Vereinigung by underlining the
Reich’s contribution to the preservation of world peace.38 More precisely,
Germany had committed itself before the other big European nations to
promoting mutual understanding and friendship among peoples, to securing
their rights and to contributing to an enduring balance of their interests. That
commitment was stronger than ever, declared Lorenz in 1938, and this was due
to the creation of the Vereinigung.39 The bilateral unions and societies
Germany had set up many years ago were, according to him, better organised,
while new ones were planned, primarily for neutral states, including Greece.40
Those societies, clubs and unions, such as the German-French Society, the
German-Turkish Society, the German-Greek Society and the like, were
practically the standard cultural bearers and transmitters of German culture,
even though they were described as organisations of cultural reciprocity. Their
mission was the exchange of cultural goods, through which the nations could
understand each other. Education should have pride of place in those bilateral
organisations.41 Lorenz’s argument sounds strange, even unreal, at a time when
Germany was preparing for war and the Four-year Plan had already been put
into practice. So how can his peace declaration be reconciled with Germany’s
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war planning? Did he have his own vision for the state’s foreign cultural policy
or was something else hidden behind his peace rhetoric? It is interesting that his
note was confidential. Therefore, if it was not some kind of diplomatic rhetoric
addressed to the people or the authorities of some other nation in order to
convince them of Germany’s good intentions, how could his language be
justified in terms of Nazi ideology?
The National Socialist Party, which was attracted to the idea of cultural
domination of the world, strove to get involved in areas of activity that at that
time were the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry. After the hard and justified
criticism had been made by the Ministry of the impact a Nazi-oriented cultural
propaganda might have for German interests, it is possible that Lorenz, as a
senior Party member, wished, in his note, to underline the “careful and smooth
introduction” to the Nazi ideals. It is also likely, that the Party authorities
adopted a new moderate language as a concession to the demands made by the
Foreign Ministry for a cultural policy abroad that steered clear of any overtly
political propaganda. However, the cover of “understanding other peoples and
preserving world peace” provided by the party has proven to be  mere rhetoric,
if one believes the reciprocity of the “understanding” declared by Lorenz. It
seems, however, that what the Nazis desired was to be understood by other
nations rather than to understand them. In addition, the way they perceived
world peace and the means one should use to preserve it were governed by their
Weltanschauung, which incited hostility depending on the perceived status of
the race concerned. The confidential character of the Mitteilungen der
Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbände und Einrichtungen e.V., which are
the official records of the organisation’s activities, advocates the propagandistic
nature of the Vereinigung, as the material published on an irregular basis was
strictly controlled.
Among the tasks of the Vereinigung was its engagement in several
organisations in the Balkan states. In 1938, for example, the Vereinigung became
involved in the change in directorship of the South-East European Institute in
Vienna (Südosteuropa-Institut in Wien).42 The Institute was of great scientific and
economic significance for the entire Viennese administration. The extent, however,
of the Vereinigung’s involvement in the directorship of the Südosteuropa-Institut
is not clear. What is certain, though, is the role the bilateral societies had to play,
as they were regarded as the unofficial vehicles of Germany’s cultural campaign
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abroad.43 Nonetheless, the question that still troubled the foreign cultural policy-
makers was whether the “cultural vehicles” should be engaged in a covert political
undertaking and, if so, to what extent. In 1939 a working programme for those
societies was drawn up, in case they should eventually be used for political
propaganda purposes. The programme focused on the organisation of the two-
sided leagues, the undertakings abroad and at home, and the affiliation with other
institutions.44 As for the organisational part, the first thing to be done was the
liquidation of the organisations that were set up by enemy states, implying
essentially France, and their replacement either by new societies with Germany as
a partner or by old ones, which should be re-established. The external cultural
undertakings organised by the Vereinigung, according to the working plan, should
include the development of propaganda material, and the promotion of
exhibitions and lectures by German politicians, the military and other personalities
who were supporters of the Nazi ideology. Additionally, the two-sided societies and
leagues abroad would be responsible for the promotion of the institutes planned
to be established in the countries where they were active, as well as for the creation
of German libraries and the promotion of German, or rather Nazi, writings. The
publication of journals regarding cultural activities in the local community and the
surveillance of the cultural developments of other countries, particularly of those
hostile to Germany, should also be among the duties of the bilateral leagues.
Equally important would be the influence they could exert on the public opinion
of the country in question. Ultimately, the bilateral unions, acting as an
intermediary intelligence agency, should develop close ties with the information
department of the Foreign Ministry and the defence section of the Wehrmacht, as
well as with the Secret Police Office.
At the beginning of 1939 the Vereinigung made an agreement with the
“German Central Office for Congresses” (Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale, DKZ),
the chief organisation for the support and control of delegations for academic
meetings abroad.45 It was established in December 1934 by the Reich Ministry
of Propaganda in agreement with the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the
Interior. Its origins lay in a branch of the Medical Society of Berlin and its aim
was to provide help in organising medical congresses. It was initially called  the
“Central Office for Scientific Congresses” (Wissenschaftliche Kongress-
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Zentrale). Soon the organisation comprised all scientific disciplines, and the
Ministry of Propaganda together with the Ministry of Education changed its
name to the Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale. The task of the DKZ was, on the one
hand, to advise all the existing scientific institutions that organised international
meetings in Germany and, on the other, to assess the experience of the
undertaking for future cultural-political planning. In this framework, co-
operation with Germany’s bilateral organisations abroad was essential, in order
for the DKZ to be informed about the foreign participants who were going to
attend the relevant congresses.46 Foreign scientists who had been educated in
German technical schools or universities tended to defend Germany’s prestige,
not only in their own countries, but also in the international scientific
community. After 1938 the DKZ was eager to revive and strengthen the
foreigners’ affection for Germany, which in the previous few years had been
diminished as they had turned to Britain, France and the United States. The
reason, argued the Nazis, was the anti-German propaganda by those nations that
derived from a “ridiculous misunderstanding [of German culture] that was due
to their political economy”.47 On the other hand, in cases in which Germany was
invited to international meetings, the DKZ should come to an agreement with
the ministries in charge and other institutions – whether State or Party – and
choose a “selected group of appropriate participants” to represent the Reich.48
Repeating the post-war arguments about Germany’s catastrophic cultural
collapse, the head of the DKZ, Dr Knapp, stressed the cultural-political
significance of national and international scientific associations and their
meetings.49 He argued further that the system of congresses combined with high
politics would allow Germany to influence international organisations, as France
had done at the end of the Great War.50 Nevertheless, Germany’s cultural-
political struggle, specified Knapp, aimed at having the foreign nations
understand and recognise the Reich’s cultural achievements and at having them
exchange experiences with them on knowledge, ideas and values.51 When the war
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broke out in 1939, the DKZ, the Vereinigung and the DAAD began to collaborate
closely to increase the number of foreign scholars in Germany and thus to
activate what was called “supporting troops”.52 The cultural-political dimension
of congresses organised by national or international institutions had been very
well known in Germany since 1919. So was the impact of the country’s isolation
from them at France’s insistence. Their country, they argued, at that time had
been completely undefended against the Allies’ strategy, which paralysed its voice
and actions abroad. The DKZ was a response – albeit belated – to any potential
similar threat for Germany’s culture, either by France or by any other would-be
imitator. About a thousand international organisations, reported the DAAD in
1940, from every possible field of human activity still presented a common front
against German science and culture. A thousand more existed in Germany for its
defence but they were weakened by their lack of manpower – a direct result of
their downsizing by many authorities.53 The role of the DKZ was to centralise
power by taking the organisation of congresses and other external activities of the
German scientific institutions under its control and thus mounting its defence of
German culture.
Trying to Conquer the Hearts and Minds of South-East Europe
In 1940 the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs inaugurated a network of
institutes abroad, with the mission to champion German achievements in
humanities in specific European countries. The German Scientific Institutes
(Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Institute, DWI), as they were named, under the
cover of science aimed at exploring those countries in which Germany was
interested and preparing them to align themselves with the Nazi regime. This
overture clearly involved “space research” (Raumforschung) in order for these
territories to be “repopulated and exploited” (Umvolkung und Ausbeutung).54
Nevertheless, the basis of this campaign was aimed at scientific collaboration
with the countries in question and the development of relations with the
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foreign élite.55 During the following four years, sixteen branches of the DWI
were established not only in major European cities, i.e. Paris, Brussels,
Copenhagen, Helsinki, Stockholm, Lisbon, Madrid, Venice, Budapest, but also
in the following Balkan cities: Sofia, Bucharest, Bratislava, Belgrade, Athens,
Zagreb and Tirana. The DWI co-operated with the German Academy to
arrange receptions, exhibitions and lectures. Even though a network of several
institutions (State, industrial or private) existed in the disciplines of technology,
medicine and natural sciences before 1933, a similar network in humanities was
a Nazi creation and indicated the special role allotted to humanities by the
Third Reich.56 The DWI was not another organisation with a number of
branches spread over Europe, but it offered, as Hausmann notes, the means for
an intellectual war in the “third front” (Dritte Front).57
The structure of each DWI branch abroad consisted of at least three main
departments: the scientific department, which was financially supported by the
Emergency Office for German Science (Notgemeinschaft der deutschen
Wissenschaft), which had been founded in the very first years of the Weimar
Republic, and organised the exchange of professors, lecture trips, exhibitions,
concerts and book fairs; the academic department, supported by the German
Academic Exchange Office (DAAD), existing since 1925, and therefore
responsible for the exchange of students, teachers, etc.; and the department of
language issues, which received funds from the Goethe Institute.58 However,
none of the above departments conducted research independently. The DWI
was involved in joint research under the auspices of academies or other
institutions. The scientific results, though, of those projects were very poor.59
Even though it was part of the scientific sector, which, by definition, includes
both the exact and the theoretical sciences, the DWI was usually confined to
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activities regarding only the latter. In some cases, agricultural science belonged
to another separate section,60 but as far as the rest of the natural sciences were
concerned, they did not seem to be seriously represented in any of the DWI
branches. No matter how awkward it may sound, in the war years the Nazis
seemed to have believed that the litterae should not stand behind the arma.
Moreover, the theoretical sciences should also become “fighting sciences”
(kämpfende Wissenschaften) and make their contribution to the final victory.61
The Aryans believed their higher mission in this world would not be
accomplished only through territorial but also through cultural expansion. It is
interesting to note, though, that in 1942 the leader of the cultural department
of the Foreign Ministry, von Twardowski, argued that the societies of lesser
importance, such as the Union of Authors or of Composers, should not play a
leading role in the international organisations and congresses. On the contrary,
priority should be given to other more important disciplines like medicine and
chemistry. The importance of language remained, however, in any case, very
high, and he underlined that “in the centre of every cultural policy stands
language”.62 Therefore, the director of a DWI branch, appointed by the
German Academy in Munich, usually occupied the Chair of German at a
foreign university. 
Nevertheless, Germany, complained Twardowski, did not appreciate the
political significance of purely cultural activity abroad during the war, even
though everyone in the country admired the well-planned cultural policy of
France and acknowledged how much damage it had made to Germany, after
1919. He stressed that cultural policy presented “missed opportunities” and
Germany was about to miss one this time as well. Everything in Europe was
fluid and there were many areas, argued Twardowski further, in which
Germany could get a foothold, provided the Reich could accurately assess and
make use of the situation before its rivals took action.63 What Germany should
do, according to the German cultural specialist, was to invest time, money and
qualified people, allowing for the fact that patience and understanding were
also important elements in the war years.64 Despite the fact that no serious
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research was conducted in the DWI branches, they were designed to play an
important role in disseminating German culture abroad, in Europe in
particular. Nevertheless, it was not an easy task, as the DWI, like every other
institution in the Third Reich, was subject to the “polycratic principle”,
according to which a number of ministries and offices were involved in and
were entitled to have their say in its affairs.65
The campaign of German culture as such was the task of a number of other
scientific centres in Europe that had been established before the Nazis’ seizure of
power. The Bibliotheca Herziana in Rome, which the Kaiser Wilhelm Society
owned since 1914, was one such example.66 Meanwhile, the Society became
partner in a number of scientific institutes abroad, which according to the official
statutes were created for the cultivation and promotion of cultural and scientific
relations between Germany and their respective host countries. In that
framework, the Zoological Station in Rovigno, which had belonged to the Society
since 1911, was transformed in 1930 into a German-Italian Institute for Marine
Biology. The Reich’s effort to establish similar bilateral scientific research centres
in Europe was accelerated in 1940 against the backdrop of the continuing war.
The eagerness to have German scientific bases beyond its borders at that
particular time is obviously not irrelevant to its political and military plans. The
first such institute was created in Sofia, named the “German-Bulgarian Institute
for Agricultural Research”. It was followed by the “German-Greek Research
Institute for Biology” in Piraeus, while serious plans were made for the creation
of a “German-Hungarian Institute for Agricultural Research” in Budapest, and a
“German-Bulgarian Research Station for Microbiology” on the Greek island of
Thasos, which had been annexed by Bulgaria. 
All the above feverish efforts to make the Nazis’ cultural presence noticeable
in Europe were sealed by a number of cultural agreements between the Reich
and some European countries, focusing on the South-East European states.
The initiative for the accords was taken by the Reich’s Foreign Ministry. The
main concerns of these agreements were the inclusion of German in the
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curricula of other countries as the main foreign language, the creation of
cultural institutes, the exchange of scholars, and the status of German schools
abroad. In other words, the bilateral contracts confirmed at the State level
almost all the cultural initiatives Germany had taken in the past. For the
Foreign Ministry, the dissemination of German was the number one priority of
the Reich’s cultural policy abroad, with scholarships following next in order of
importance.67 In 1936 the Third Reich signed its first bilateral cultural
agreement with Hungary. The agreement was initiated by the German Ministry
of Education and it was the first (and also the last) such accord to be initiated
by a ministry other than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.68 The contract
stipulated, among other things, the strengthening and intensification of
scientific relations between the Reich and the named country. This meant in
practice the mutual creation of “guest chairs” at universities in both countries
to host short or long-term lecture series. It also meant the exchange of
university assistants, the creation of positions for scholars at local universities,
and the granting of scholarships for student exchange by the DAAD and the
Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung.69
Two years later, when the changes in the cultural section of the Foreign
Ministry were completed, a number of contracts were signed between the Reich
and the Balkan countries.70 In 1938 Germany signed a cultural agreement with
Greece, in 1940 with Bulgaria, in 1941 with Romania, and in 1942 with
Slovakia. Meanwhile, in 1938, the Nazis had signed similar agreements with the
Axis countries, namely Italy and Japan, and in 1939 with Spain. The priority of
all these agreements was the promotion of German culture, i.e. music, theatre,
literature, fine arts, and above all the language. Germany “discovered” the
cultural agreements in a period in which the State was intensifying its foreign
policy, thereby securing its alliances with countries that were ideologically
affiliated to the Reich.71 On the other hand, the Nazis aspired to create a larger
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Europe under their control, where German would be the dominant language.
South-East Europe had a particular importance in the Reich’s foreign policy
agenda. It had a great geographical, political, economic and cultural
significance for German interests in territories far beyond that region. The
National Socialists regarded the Balkan states as a bridge to the Near and
Middle East and beyond.72 These were territories influenced by the British,
while the Balkans were in general influenced by the French. To a certain extent
Nazi Germany saw the Balkan Peninsula both as colonial territory as well as the
threshold for its future colonial plans, when the Reich would annex the
possessions of its defeated enemies, namely France and Great Britain. The
occupation of France by the Nazis in 1940 did not, however, mean that French
cultural dominance in the Balkan states was ended and that the Germans could
continue their cultural propaganda undisturbed. In 1942 the number of French
nationals travelling to South-East Europe for cultural-political reasons, as the
Germans believed, increased. Therefore, they decided to prohibit French
travellers from entering any Balkan state, even if they tried to do so via Italy,
where they could get the necessary documents.73 Germans were also aware that
they were not popular abroad. “They respect us, they admire us for our
achievements, they are afraid of us, but they don’t want to be like us,” noted
Twardowski in 1942. The ideal German life resembled the military life,
characterised by discipline, work, efficiency and sacrifice. It was not surprising,
therefore, that such a way of living was not attractive to other nations, which
preferred the French or the English lifestyle.74 Nevertheless, Germany
continued to champion its culture through language propaganda in the several
institutions abroad, scholarships and new types of research institutes. Two such
developments were the Institute for Seed Research in Bulgaria and the Institute
for Marine Biological Research in Greece, both branches of the Kaiser Wilhelm
Society. In addition, plans for the creation of hospitals affiliated to German
clinics in Athens and in Galatz, Romania, for research into rare diseases was a
cultural-political undertaking that seriously troubled the German Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.75
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From 1938-40 all cultural institutes abroad were also controlled by the Reich
Ministry of Education, which because of its inexperience in such matters was a
force for stagnation to Germany’s cultural-political work abroad. It should be
noted that the Ministry of Education, because of its close relations to the Nazi
Party and the Wehrmacht, was able to get involved in the Reich’s foreign
cultural policy, thereby by-passing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would
normally have played a leading role in these undertakings. It is true that the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had great experience in the management of cultural
affairs since the Bismarck era. Its greatest advantage was the specially trained
personnel spread all over the world that the Ministry had at its disposal. A
number of people working at several embassies or consulates gathered valuable
information about the local conditions that would facilitate or hinder a
successful cultural policy. Very often, they used their personal networks in the
country of interest, something that demanded diplomatic skills and time for the
development of relationships of trust with the local élite. The Ministry of
Education had none of these resources and its involvement could damage
German interests. Nonetheless, in the end, in a number of undertakings the two
ministries eventually shared responsibility and supervision. 
Around 1938 an unsigned note addressed to the Foreign Ministry, with the
title “Establishment of German Cultural Institutes Abroad”, presumably from
the Ministry of Education, gives some idea of the character and the guidelines
for the institutes abroad, but also the rationale for their establishment. The
rationale put forward was anti-French, not surprising perhaps as France was
Germany’s oldest and biggest cultural rival, particularly in South-East Europe.
The note underlined that the German institutes should have a different profile
from their French equivalents.76 The latter were more or less affiliated to the
French higher education system. This meant that the foreigners who attended
them had to follow a series of courses like French, literature, history, art history
and so forth, and at the end of their studies they gained the appropriate
certificate.77 Unlike France, Germany’s plans were to establish cultural institutes
that were less academic and more adapted to the present.78 What was meant by
“present” was quite clear. The mission of the cultural institutes abroad should
not be the dissemination of German culture in general, but the promotion of
modern Germany. The institutes should rather try to spread the Party’s ideals,
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focusing on recent German history, namely National Socialism. The French
Revolution brought no serious change in the world, argued the Nazis, and
“despite all the vague contemporary notions, like naturalism and materialism, as
a result of its strong formalism and logical intellectualism”, its content remained
empty. In contrast to French cultural ideals, National Socialism transcended the
liberal thinking introduced by the French Revolution, bringing a deep change,
as it was claimed, to political thought.79 However, the rest of the world knew
almost nothing about this change and did not seem to understand it. Therefore,
in order for the new political theory – which, according to the Nazis, was
superior to the existing Western political system introduced by France – to be
further transmitted, they had to follow a different strategy from their rivals.
It is clear that what the Nazis understood by “culture” was everything that
derived from the National Socialist ideology, and they believed that cultural
policy should have political connotations. Consequently, the Reich’s cultural
institutes abroad should not be limited to the propagation of language and
science. They should provide other elements of German greatness as well, like
the history of the National Socialist movement, the organisation of young
people according to National Socialist ideals, national, social and educational
policy, as well as books, the arts and sports.80 The Nazis were very much aware
of the possible resistance their views might meet in Western democracies, like
France and Britain. Therefore, they had to introduce those people to the merits
of their ideology gradually. As for those countries with similar political regimes,
like Italy and Japan, they could act in a more open and direct fashion.81
However, the blunt political profile that the Nazis so strongly proposed for the
Reich’s cultural propaganda abroad seemed to be moderated in the following
years, mainly because of the resistance of the Foreign Ministry and particularly
its cultural-political department. Nevertheless, many of the Nazi elements
penetrated the Reich’s cultural political agenda, even when the Foreign
Ministry was in charge of most of the projects abroad. 
Besides the “Western democracies” and the “politically allied” countries,
South-East Europe had a different significance for Germany’s cultural plans.
Unlike the rest of Europe, the Balkans were crucial for the Nazi geopolitical
enterprise. This territory was seen as their “living sphere” (Lebenssphäre) and
the economic and political completion of the Reich in the South-East.82 The
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Balkan states were the second most important territory after Ukraine that could
provide Germany with agricultural products and could make the country self-
sufficient for the planned war.83 However, this sort of colonisation would not
be successful without a well-organised cultural policy. Germany would secure
its political and economic hegemony over the South-East countries only if it
could dominate them culturally.84 The cultural initiatives that were taken to
influence them after World War I seemed inadequate for the Reich’s purposes
in the region; and despite the historical links that some of the countries had had
with the Habsburg Empire, these were not enough for Germany to overcome
its cultural stagnation in those territories caused by financial and bureaucratic
deficiencies. If the Third Reich did not want to see those potential colonies
turning towards Paris, Rome or even London, then Berlin should inaugurate a
systematic and competitive cultural policy.85
The Südosteuropa Gesellschaft and Its Cultural-political Role
in the Balkans
In 1940 the person in charge at the politico-economic section in the IG Farben
industry, Anton Reithinger, underlined the capital importance South-East
Europe could play for the Reich’s economy, more precisely its war economy.86
Having occupied France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the
Nazis were certain that the French and English competition in the Balkans
would be eliminated and the Reich could almost exclusively exploit the mineral
resources as well as the agricultural production of the region.87 Wheat, corn,
olives, oil, wood and other forest resources, minerals and textile fibres made up
the Balkans’ natural wealth, which was to prove essential for the Third Reich’s
economy. The region, argued Reithinger, would be important as an investment
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market area that, after the end of the war, would secure Germany’s export
profits in the long term. In addition, Germany’s investment of industrial capital
in South-East Europe, particularly in road, water or railway networks, would
create the necessary technical preconditions for larger and cheaper exploitation
of its raw materials.88
Achieving that goal, Germany did not escape the complexity of distribution
of duties and power by several institutions, a complexity that was characteristic
of the polycratic Nazi regime. What was also characteristic were the rivalries
among those institutions, often leading to the establishment of new umbrella
organisations, transferring the tension onto another level. This was the case of
the two most influential organisations for Germany’s expansion to the South-
East, namely the Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftstag (Central European
Economic Council, MWT) and the Südosteuropa Gesellschaft (South-East
European Society, SOEG), both of which had their central offices in Vienna.
Even though both were created for the same purpose, to establish economic
influence over the Balkans and to exploit its resources, they did little to co-
operate with each other towards their stated goals. The SOEG, unlike the
MWT, was a newly established organisation. On 14 October 1939, within the
framework of the Economic and Commercial Fair in Vienna, the Minister of
Finance, Walther Funk, and the Gauleiter and Governor of Vienna, Josef
Buerkel, made a speech about the initiatives Austria should take with regard to
the Reich’s war economy and the role of South-East Europe.89 They further
presented the foundations for the creation of a department dedicated to the
South-East European economy in Vienna. Austria was regarded as the
indispensable geopolitical area for Germany’s interests, the “bridge pillar”
(Brückenpfeiler) to the South-East,90 which traditionally had close relations
with the region. The department, therefore, was considered a “vein of life”
(Lebensader) for Germany’s war economy.91 Its role was to put Austrian
companies and the Austrian economy, in general, at the disposition of the
Reich, taking measures to secure industrial production, the promotion of
exports and the tariff policy.92 At the same time, it was expected that the
commercial exchange with the Balkan countries would help Germany to break
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Britain’s efforts to blockade the Reich’s economy.93 Several months later, on 8
February 1940, those first plans to “decentralise the activities and the
administration of Germany’s economy from Berlin to Vienna”,94 took shape in
the new institution, the SOEG. 
According to its founding articles, the role of the SOEG was “to cultivate,
strengthen and foster Germany’s relations with the South-East countries”.95 In
fact, what was hidden behind this euphemistic declaration was the co-
ordination of research for the East on the ulterior motives of the unification and
Germanisation of the Balkan people and their economic exploitation, as the
region was considered the “economic supplementary space” of Germany.96 The
organisation should be in close co-operation with all authorities, unions,
institutes, societies and other similar institutions that were connected to the
Balkan countries or aimed at establishing economic or cultural relations with
them.97 In June 1941, in order to avoid further rivalries between the SOEG and
the MWT, it was suggested by the latter and the Reich’s industrial circles that
the SOEG should be engaged in the scientific preparation of the industrial
activities in South-East Europe. A committee with economic-scientific
competencies was constituted in the SOEG at the beginning of 1942. The SOEG
was subjected to the Reich’s Ministry of Finance and worked under the auspices
of the Minister of Finance and president of the German Bank, Walter Funk.98
Nevertheless, the organisation was not to be attached to any state, party,
industrial or other economic organisation, but to be autonomous.99 In addition,
it was to take necessary action to avoid conflicts and rivalries with other
organisations. Moreover, it should rather be careful, even wary of co-operating
with all of them, operating as an umbrella organisation.100 The president of the
society was initially appointed the Reich Commissar for the Reunification of
Austria with the German Reich, Josef Buerkel, and a year later the Governor and
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Gauleiter in Vienna, Baldur von Schirach, while the vice-president became the
Reich Brigadier and Mayor of Vienna, Hans Blaschke.101
Despite the scientific role the SOEG was called on to play, it did not run any
scientific programme of its own. It operated rather as a coordinating
organisation for numerous other institutions focused on South-East issues,
either engaged in theoretical science or in practical economy, without
obstructing the execution of their projects.102 Many of these programmes
conducted research on nutrition, export and import trade, industry and
transportation. The practical issues the SOEG supervised were focused on two
major areas: agriculture and industry. A number of leading enterprises became
interested in the new organisation and among those that joined its projects
were the IG Farben Industry, the Coal Syndicate and the German-American
Petroleum Society.103 After 1938 the Nazi successive march to the East and the
war developments in the following years increased the Reich’s interest in
exploiting the raw materials of the Balkans. Iron, manganese, copper, chrome,
bauxite, coal, liquid petroleum gas and, above all, oil were the most important
resources that Germany desperately needed, in order to buttress its war
economy. Manganese, for example, was among the most important minerals
required for the production of iron and steel, while bauxite was significant for
the fabrication of aluminium, a material used by Luftwaffe for building planes.
The aluminium economy in the Balkans was very large and therefore of great
importance for Germany. The Italian exploitation of Balkan bauxite deposits
made German eagerness to gain a foothold in the region ever greater. 
In 1942 European shortages in food supplies increased the importance of
the Balkans, as they were also a valuable agricultural and cattle-breeding
resource, with great potential for farming plants rich in fat and proteins.104 As
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autarky in food supplies was one of the major problems of the German war
economy, the SOEG established in 1941 the “South-East Agricultural Institute”
(Südost-Agrarinstitut der Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft e.V.), also based in
Vienna. The institute reported to the University for Agronomy (Hochschule
für Bodenkultur). It was underlined that the Südost-Agrarinstitut should not
be engaged in the economic undertakings of any commercial enterprise.105 On
the contrary, it should carry out its own business, namely to consult the SOEG
at a scientific level about the provision of supplies and agricultural and forest
exploitation issues. Among the responsibilities of the new institute were
agriculture and “territorial research” in the South-East. To these ends, the
institute would grant scholarships to young scientists of that region to study at
the University for Agronomy in Vienna.106 The work carried out should be
focused on practical applications, that is to say, to meet the war needs. If the
institute was engaged in other projects than these, stressed the general director
of the SOEG, August Heinrichsbauer, the Südost-Agrarinstitut had no
future.107 Some of the experiments carried out at the agricultural institute were
on soya beans, oil-reach pumpkins, olives, corn, and even on different sheep
breeds for milk production and other milk-based products.108 Other projects
that were planned to be carried out at the Südost-Agrarinstitut had to do,
among other things, with the so-called “industrial plants”, namely fruits and
vegetables that could be canned, hemp, and above all kok-saghyz, from which
one could take rubber, so essential for the Reich’s war economy. Bulgaria had a
highly developed canning industry; moreover it was regarded as the right place
for potential rubber plantations.109 Even though the Kaiser Wilhelm Society
was engaged in research on almost all the above problems, only some
departments of its institutes, such as the Department for Animal Pathology at
the Institute for Heredity Research, contributed to the SOEG’s projects with its
directors giving lectures to the Südost-Agrarinstitut in Vienna.110 All the above
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projects, whether carried out in the SOEG or in the Kaiser Wilhelm Society
were classified important or decisive for the war (kriegswichtig/kriegsent-
scheidend). Other important research institutes with which the organisation
was involved were: the Institute for Economic Research in Vienna; the Institute
for Consumption and Commerce, also in Vienna; the South-East Seminar
organised by the SOEG and the German Academy; and the South-East Institute
for Forest and Timber Research created by the SOEG.111
Among the problems investigated by the first institute was that of bauxite
exploitation, while the Institute for Forest and Timber Research was engaged in
research on malaria, and particularly in mapping malaria-infested areas and
those in which the Anopheles mosquito reproduced. Experiments on fighting
the Anopheles with healing herbs like quinine in Bulgaria and northern Greece
were also part of the institute’s project.112
The SOEG also planned to develop the industrial sector of the Balkans – that
is to say to exploit its production – and, in order to influence the region
economically, politically and culturally, it used the network of authorities,
unions, institutes, societies and other organisations that Germany had already
developed in the Balkan states. The bilateral friendship unions that had existed
for many years between Germany and those countries, like the German-Greek
Society and the German-Bulgarian Society, created branches in Vienna for
closer collaboration with the SOEG. The work performed under the supervision
of the SOEG soon transcended the borders of Austria, and the organisation set
up branches in almost all the Balkan states, i.e. Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Romania, Serbia, Croatia and Greece, for gathering information valuable for the
economic planning of the area. Branches were also created in Berlin and
Munich. It should be underlined that in their effort to exploit the wealth of the
Balkans, the Nazis activated not only the full panoply of the state economic
mechanism, but also some of the bearers or representatives of German culture,
such as the German Academy. The number of interdisciplinary projects the
SOEG undertook demanded co-operation with other scientific institutes. If
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these institutes happened to have branches in the South-East countries, so much
the better. The only such institution was the German Scientific Institute (DWI),
with which the SOEG developed close relations. 
Vienna had the great potential to become the educational centre of South-
East Europe for the Nazis, as it had been in the past, particularly for agrarian
studies. Therefore, the universities of the Austrian capital could play an
important role not only in the promotion of research on the Balkans, but also
in the Reich’s foreign cultural policy.113 Nevertheless, there were a number of
problems that had to be dealt with, in order for Germany and Austria to be able
to attract as many students, economists and other experts or interested scholars
as possible, not only from the Reich but also from the Balkans. In 1942
agronomic studies in Germany were neither as intensive nor as broad as they
had previously been, nor as they had been in the South-East countries or Italy.
In addition, the three-year courses in Germany were considered insufficient, as
the Balkan countries offered four-year courses of studies. As for the practical
application of theory, this was something lacking in Germany in contrast to the
Balkans. The high fees, compared to France, charged at Vienna University and
its poor equipment also made the institution unattractive.114
Nevertheless, it seems that in order to meet the Reich’s wishes, at least to
some extent, the SOEG took some measures for promoting Germany’s cultural
relations with the Balkan states. The cultural-political undertakings of the
organisation gained almost equal importance to the theoretical-scientific and
the practical-economic projects. Most of these initiatives took place in the
framework of the cultural activity of the city of Vienna, even though they had
or they should have had their own character. One of the closest relationships
the SOEG had developed with Vienna’s cultural organisations was with the
“Society of Friends of the German Academy”. In 1942 the city of Vienna, the
SOEG and the German Academy established the “South-East seminar”
(Südostseminar).115 The director of the seminar was Otto Kunz and its stated
aim was to familiarise those who were interested in South-East Europe with
the region through language courses, lectures, expeditions and other cultural
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and scholarly, economic, activities.116 The extension of the programme to
foreigners was also anticipated. The SOEG affiliated with the Department of
South-East Union of the Vienna universities (Abteilung Südostgemeinschaft
der Wiener Hochschulen in der SOEG) and the laboratories of Vienna
universities, in order to study the scientific problems of the region.117 The
Department of South-East Union embraced about twelve universities in
Austria and the Protectorate, and its role was to centralise and manage
scientific work of every kind related to the South-East and conducted at
universities and institutes.118 The programme of the Südostseminar, which
lasted a week, included a series of lectures on agricultural and economic issues,
but also a number of cultural activities dedicated not only to the Reich but also
to one or more Balkan countries at a time. Scientists from several German
universities and research institutes usually lectured in front of students but
very often their audience also comprised military officers and soldiers. It is
interesting to note that to cater to the needs of the seminar the authorities of
the city of Vienna, the German Academy and the SOEG signed an agreement
for the establishment of another institute, the Prinz Eugen-Institut. The role
of this new institute was to co-ordinate the scientific and cultural activities of
the above three partners, namely to promote joint propaganda initiatives
through courses, the organisation of big cultural events and other cultural-
political and scientific undertakings.119 In the framework of the Prinz Eugen-
Institut, the German Academy, in co-operation with the Ministry of
Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, offered language courses for
foreign students at Vienna universities and technical schools. The increase in
the number of foreign students who took language courses from 1942 to 1944
is quite impressive:120
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Table 2 
DATE NUMBER OF FOREIGN STUDENTS
October 1942 – February 1943 138 
March 1943 – June 1943 150
October 1943 – February 1944 227
March 1944 – June 1944 312
The seminar was divided into two sections: one for foreigners and a second
for Germans and Austrians. The latter offered a series of courses in almost all
the Balkan languages,121 as well as introductory seminars on the land, culture
and the people of the region. The foreigners, on the other hand, could take
similar courses for language, organised by the personnel of the German
Academy and the Ministry of Education,122 as well as for politics, economy and
the culture of the “Great German Reich”. Language learning was the first step
the SOEG should take in order to attract foreigners to enrol in the universities
in Vienna and to continue their studies there subsequently, usually in trade and
industrial economy, agriculture and the related sciences. These young scientists
were expected to become Germany’s “extending hand” after returning to their
homelands, strengthening at the same time the ties with Germany and
eventually being well disposed towards the Reich’s interests.123 The number of
young Balkans who visited the Reich’s universities seemed to be quite big, given
the fact that the war was in progress and Germany exercised brutal occupation
policies against some Balkan peoples. The cultural-political and the economic-
political significance (kultur- und wirtschaftspolitisch) of granting scholarships
to young scientists from the Balkans, basically to do Ph.D. research at the
University for Agronomy, was well acknowledged by the director of the SO-
Agrarinstitut and professor at the above university.124
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Table 3
Percentage of foreign scientists who visited German/Austrian universities 
from October 1941 to October 1942
Bulgarians 22.9% Japanese 3.84% Ukrainians 2.15% Indians 1.25%
Romanians 8.85% Greeks 3.84% Belgians 1.96% Arabs 1.16%
Chinese 7.33% Spaniards 3.75% Slovaks 1.8% Peruvians 1.07%
Hungarians 7.4% Dutch 3.6% Swedes 1.7%
Croats 6.6% Swiss 3.04% Tuerks 1.6%
Italians 6.08% Persians 2.5% Danes 1.34% 7.24% from 24
other states
Source: Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), R 63/174: H. Baatz. “Auslandsamt der Dozentenschaft der
deutschen Universitäten und Hochschulen. Jahresarbeitsbericht 1 Oktober 1941 bis 30 September
1942. (Streng vertaulich!)”
Even though prizes and grants were funded for German students, like the
Prinz-Eugen-Preis of the Goethe-Stiftung and the Prinz-Eugen-Studien-
stiftung, that strong cultural propaganda tool was not applied to foreigners, at
least at the beginning, something that troubled the authorities of the SOEG
very early on.125 However, it is unlikely that similar grants were later given to
Balkan scholars directly by the SOEG. As the granting of scholarships to
foreigners was the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry, the SOEG tried to
avoid any conflicts with it. Thus, the cultural-political programme of the SOEG
was only involved in occasional and carefully selected cultural activities.126
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Conclusion
If the argument that culture alone does not justify the eagerness of any power to
expand abroad seems to be distinct, focusing on a totalitarian regime, as it was
Nazi Germany and the complex organisation of its foreign cultural policy, makes
it more evident, if not apocalyptic. Driven by its nationalistic ideology, Hitler’s
Germany developed an acute cultural nationalism that it was eager to impose on
the rest of Europe. Hitler used the existing cultural propaganda mechanism that
had been developed in the Weimar Republic. However, unlike that period, in
which only two Ministries (Foreign Affairs and Education) were involved in the
country’s foreign cultural policy, the Third Reich involved a number of
institutions in propagating German culture abroad. These included the Ministry
of the Interior, Amt Rosenberg, the Ahnenerbe Office of the Reichsführer SS and
the National Socialist Organisation for Issues Abroad (Auslandsorganisation
(AO) der NSDAP). The involvement of so many institutions for the same purpose
reveals the polycratic structure of Hitler’s regime and the rivalries among them,
which was often at the expense of the originally designed policy. 
In the early years of National Socialism, the cultural role of natural
sciences, unlike humanities, was marginalised. With the announcement of the
Four-year Plan in 1936-37, natural sciences, together with technology, came to
the fore, however, not so much as essentially cultural tools, but rather as the
instruments that could set the military machine in motion and make it
triumph. The cultural-political role of science was regarded at that time as
complementary. It was at that time that South-East Europe regained once more
its chief importance for Germany’s foreign policy. The cultural-political or
propagandistic plan seemed to be easier to be realised in the Balkans, which
were less powerful that the other European countries, and therefore more
receptive to Germany’s cultural infiltration. During the war years, South-East
Europe became the main target for the Reich’s cultural-political plans. This
cultural rapprochement was due to Germany’s war-time economic and political
interests in the region, which was regarded by the Germans more or less as a
future colony. Therefore, from 1936 onwards the Nazis signed bilateral cultural
agreements with a number of Balkan countries as well as with their allies. For
the former, however, the trend in uni-directional communication was to take
on new tones, as the National Socialists considered the region to be
underdeveloped, and thus it was very likely to become dependent on
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Germany’s science and technology and hence on its economy. It must be
underlined, however, that the real dependent partner in this relationship was
Germany itself, as the natural resources of the Balkans became essential for its
war economy. The German systematic penetration into this region and its
efforts to dominate its cultural life were the forerunners to its economic
exploitation. The exploitation of natural resources was perhaps the most
important reason for Germany to acknowledge cultural-political credentials to
science, as its advertising abroad could attract young scholars to its universities,
who could pave the way for Germany to material success, when they returned
to their home countries. Exerting cultural influence on the Balkan youth was
nothing else than educating and training them in the Reich. Germany’s cultural
nationalism does not appear to be far from cultural imperialism or “cultural
synchronisation”.127 Economic and political influence was among the major
goals of cultural infiltration, that is “to capture markets for cultural
commodities and to establish hegemony by shaping popular consciousness”.128
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